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make themselves heard. Referring to Kafka!s In the Penal Colony – a text that illustrates
particularly well the workings of representation – and to Deleuze and Guattari!s concept
of “minor literatures” – a term coined byKafka – the article demonstrates that oneway of
copingwith the difficulties of representation is tomake aminor use of language. Contrary
to the claim that politics is fundamentally about becoming major, I argue that the task of
becoming minor is not only an essential element of emancipatory politics but also pro-
vides us with a criterion for differentiating between progressive, emancipatory forms of
speaking out and their reactionary counterparts.
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Introduction
The question of representation plays a prominent role not only in recent dis-
cussions focusing on the possibilities of political agency but also in the more
general debates on the future of liberal democracy as such. In view of ever more
trans- and supranational cooperations and parastatal entities that are neither
democratically legitimized nor to be held accountable by traditional political
procedures, representation as a fundamental principle of liberal democracies
appears to lose its significance. Indeed, we seem to experience a severe crisis of
representation. From the slogan of the Occupy movement “They don!t represent
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us!” to the demand of right-wing populist parties to let the people speak for
themselves via direct-democratic procedures such as plebiscites, the principle of
representation as a fundamental element of democratic opinion-forming and
participation is increasingly being questioned. More often than not, representa-
tion is either depicted as a distorting, patronizing, or manipulating instrument in
favor of the ruling classes and the political establishment or rejected entirely.
According to this line of reasoning, instead of clinging to the idea of repre-
sentation, politics should be giving more weight to the views of the people and
make sure that they are heard.
However, there seems to be a considerable difference between left-wing and
right-wing political projects in this regard. While progressive, emancipatory ap-
proaches (such as labor movements, anti-colonial struggles, black liberation
movements, women, gay and lesbian rights movements, or queer activism) focus
on how to give a voice to those who are excluded from the realm of political
representation and find themselves especially vulnerable to violence, poverty,
exploitation, and discrimination (such as women, people of color, subaltern
subjects, prisoners, “illegal” migrants, or refugees), right-wing populist and ex-
tremist actors try to short-circuit the representational process by claiming that
they alone represent the “real people,” usually defined as a righteous andmorally
pure entity.1 In doing so, they increasingly appropriate traditionally leftist political
strategies, appealing to the ideas of critique and emancipation,2 and presenting
themselves as the “real victims” of the liberal regime of “political correctness”
and of a “false tolerance” toward migrants and refugees. Former minorities, they
claim, are now well on their way to becoming the majority, thus threatening the
cultural identity of the autochthonous population. Examples of this kind of self-
presentation as the “real victim” of liberal, humanitarian politics are rife. Think of
white Americans maintaining that they are being turned into a minority in their
“own” country, the “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occi-
dent” (PEGIDA) inGermany, or the alt-right conspiracy theory about the “Great
Replacement” – that is, the alleged plot of an organized exchange of theEuropean
population for Muslims by means of immigration and significantly higher birth
rates. Such claims are regularly accompanied not only by the assertion of an
ethnically and culturally homogenous people but also by the call for authoritarian
leaders and law-and-order politics. To put it in a nutshell: Right-wing populist and
extremist parties are quite successful in portraying themselves as socially and
politically silenced, while in fact dominating the public discourse with their po-
litical agendas.
1 See Jan-Werner Müller,What is Populism? (Philadelphia, 2016).
2 See Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? FromMatters of Fact to
Matters of Concern”, in: Critical Inquiry 30/2 (2004): 225–48; Emmanuel Alloa, “Who!s
Afraid of the Post-Factual? FromAlternative Truth to TrueAlternatives”, in:LosAngles
Review of Books. The Philosophical Salon July 3 (2017).
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In the light of the above, I will try to establish a normative criterion allowing us
to distinguish between forms of speaking out and making oneself heard that we
ought to support, and thosewemust reject.Against thewidespread consensus that
politics is above all about obtaining majorities, I will argue that when it comes to
imagining emancipatory politics, we must also consider a particular kind of be-
coming minor. To do so, I will, first, discuss Deleuze and Foucault!s critique of
representation and its shortcomings. I will then make a detour to Kafka!s in-
triguing as well as disturbing story In the Penal Colony.This text is relevant formy
approach on several grounds: Even though it is prima facie a story about guilt,
punishment, and redemption, it is, on closer examination, also a text on the
complex workings of representation and the inevitability of speaking for and in
the place of others. This becomes particularly clear in the ambivalent position of
the European traveler who acts, in Kafka!s text, as a representative of a liberal,
humanitarian worldview, while turning away with unease from the ordinary
peoplewhose language he does not understand andwhose desire for authoritarian
rule he rejects. Furthermore, written around the collapse of theHabsburgEmpire,
the story describes a fragile situation of crisis and transition that shows certain
similarities to our current globalizedworld inwhich the transnational exchange of
information, goods, languages, and people goes hand in hand with the strength-
ening of national, religious, cultural, and ethnic fundamentalisms. In their study
on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a crisis that “accentuates everywhere
movements of deterritorialization, and invites all sorts of complex reterritoriali-
zation – archaic, mythic, or symbolist.”3 Today, this twofold movement of de- and
reterritorialization is most evident in the triumph of right-wing populist parties
and far-right groups in Europe and the United States, with, on the one hand, their
claim to cultural identity and racial, linguistic, and religious purity and, on the
other hand, their emphasis on strict border controls, anti-immigration laws, and
national superiority. Referring to Deleuze and Guattari!s concept of “minor lit-
eratures” – a term coined by Kafka – I will finally argue that the task of becoming
minor is not only an essential element of any emancipatory politics but also
enables us to differentiate between progressive and emancipatory forms of
speaking out and their reactionary counterparts.
The Role of the Intellectuals
The intellectual!s ambivalent relation to power is the focus of a conversation
between Foucault and Deleuze in March 1972. Under the title “Intellectuals and
Power,” Foucault and Deleuze discuss the role of the intellectual in political
struggles in the aftermath of the May 1968 events in France. Referring to the
3 Gilles Deleuze / Fe´lix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Minneapolis,
1986), p. 24.
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Groupe d!Information sur les Prisons, Foucault argues that the task of the in-
tellectual is no longer to speak “the truth to those who ha[ve] yet to see it” or “in
the name of those” who are unable to express it ; rather, the challenge is “to create
conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak.”4 What the events fol-
lowing 1968 and the subsequent formation of new political groups have shown is
“that the masses no longer need him [the intellectual] to gain knowledge: they
know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he, and they are
certainly capable of expressing themselves” (IP, p. 207). If things seem different,
then this is because “there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and
invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the
manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an
entire societal network” (IP, p. 207).
In otherwords, themasses are perfectly capable of speaking for themselves and
in their own name; therefore, intellectuals need to suppress the urge to function as
representatives: “In my opinion,” Deleuze tells Foucault, “you were the first to
teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others”
(IP, p. 209). Here, Deleuze not only points to the violent and oppressive character
of speaking for others but exposes what, in his view, is the fundamental failure of
the liberal model of representation. What is at stake is nothing less than a radical
critique of every form of representation – be it at the linguistic, the epistemo-
logical, or the political level: “Representation no longer exists; there!s only action
– theoretical action and practical actionwhich serve as relays, and formnetworks”
(IP, pp. 206 f.).
To put it briefly, Deleuze demands that we draw the practical and political
conclusions from the epistemological insight into the end of representation as the
central system of knowledge and classification: “We ridiculed representation and
said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this #theoretical!
conversion – to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned
can speak in a practical way on their own behalf” (IP, p. 209). What follows from
this is a radical shift in our conception of political change and transformation.
While modest forms of political change merely modify the existing system of
representation, the revolutionary practice breaks entirely with representation.
“[W]hen people begin to speak and act on their own behalf, they do not oppose
their representation … to another; they do not oppose a new representativity to
the false representativity of power” (IP, p. 211); rather, they put an end to rep-
resentation as such – as a theoretical and practical, and as an epistemological and
political paradigm.
However, Deleuze!s rejection of representation and his juxtaposition of rep-
resentation and revolution are by no means unproblematic. On the one hand, his
4 Michel Foucault / Gilles Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power”, in: Language, Coun-
ter-memory, Practice. Selected Essays & Interviews (Ithaca, NY, 1992), p. 206; hereafter
abbreviated as IP.
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anti-representational stance presupposes that it is always possible to speak for
oneself, without any form ofmediation or representation; on the other hand, such
a position assumes the unmediated self-presence of a popular will just awaiting its
articulation. Note also that Deleuze!s dismissal of representation is not as clear as
it may seem. When he rejects representation by arguing that “it is always a mul-
tiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts,” and that “all of us are
groups [groupuscules]” (IP, p. 206), one might argue that representation has not
completely disappeared, but rather has been transformed and modified: from an
external relation between pre-established entities – such as the relation between a
group and its spokesperson – to an ongoing process at the level of subject for-
mation, which also plays a crucial role in the formation of political identities.5
If this is the case, the problem is not so much representation as such as an all-
too-simple notion of representation that negates and represses the constitutive
role of representation in every act of speaking. Thus, according to Bernhard
Waldenfels, the issue is not so much that we speak for or in the place of others as
that we never really speak in the place of the other but always from our own place.
For if every speech is addressed to someone and answers to a mode of being
addressed, then it follows that in addressing and responding we necessarily as-
sume theplace of thosewe address andwho address us. “Thus,Eurocentrism – like
every other kind of ethnocentrism – turns out to be a repressed form of repre-
sentation.”6
There is a need to take a closer look at the complexworkings of representation.
This is all the more important as “the first step in the reversal of power and the
initiation of new struggles against existing forms of power” is the struggle of
naming and speaking out, as Foucault makes clear: “to speak on this subject, to
force the institutionalized networks of information to listen, to produce names, to
point the finger of accusation, to find targets” (IP, p. 214). This assertion, however,
takes us back to the question of how this naming and speaking out might be
possible for thosewho are systematically excluded from the realmof language and
representation. How can those whose words are inaudible for us, or resemble
more the speech of amadman than that of a human being,make themselves heard
5 In this sense, Hardt and Negri are wrong when they, following Deleuze and Guat-
tari, imagine a politics that simply leaves behind, or goes beyond, representation; they are
right, however, to claim that we cannot go back to the traditional liberal model of rep-
resentation. See Michael Hardt / Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the
Age of Empire (New York, 2004), p. 255.
6 Bernhard Waldenfels, “An Stelle von …”, in: “pathos”. Konturen eines kulturwis-
senschaftlichen Grundbegriffs, ed. Kathrin Busch and Iris Därmann (Bielefeld, 2007),
p. 48, my translation.
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– like the defiant answer of the condemned man in Kafka!s In the Penal Colony:
“Throw your whip away, or I!ll eat you up?”7
The Impossibility and Inevitability of Representation
Kafka!s In the Penal Colony can be read as a “post-colonial” and “post-repre-
sentational” text in various ways. It not only features a penal colony marked by
moral decline and the deterioration of its legal and juridical system; written in
October 1914, only a few weeks after the outbreak of the First World War, and
published in 1919, it also points to the ultimate failure of the imperial and colonial
ambitions of the German Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. Right at the
beginning of the story, Kafka describes a typical colonial scenario. A European
traveler who visits a penal colony located in the tropics is invited “to attend the
execution of a soldier who had been condemned for disobedience and insulting
behavior towards his superior” (PC, p. 75). He is accompanied by an officer who
meticulously explains to him the mechanism of “a remarkable apparatus” de-
signed by the deceased old commandant for the purpose of execution. The con-
demned man himself, who is guarded by a soldier, appears to fulfill all the am-
bivalent stereotypes of the colonized subject. He is both resistant and sub-
missively devoted, both childishly na.ve and perfidiously tricky: “a dull-witted,
wide-mouthed being with unkempt hair and a wild expression,” “a stranger,” not
“a fellow-countryman and certainly not a person to arouse one!s compassion,”
who “looked so submissive and dog-like that it seemed as if one could let him run
free on the hillsides, andwould only have towhistle at the start of the execution for
him to come” (PC, p. 75).8
7 Franz Kafka, “In the Penal Colony”, in: The Metamorphosis and Other Stories
(Oxford, 2009), p. 80; hereafter abbreviated as PC.
8 This image of the condemned man is thwarted by his apparent will to knowledge,
which follows an ostensive logic of gazes and gestures. Given the indifference of the
soldier and the condemnedman to the explanations of the officer – “for the officer spoke
French, and certainly neither the soldier nor the condemnedman understood French” – it
is all themore striking “that nevertheless the condemnedmanmade every effort to follow
the officer!s explanations” (PC, p. 77), thereby imitating and parodying the movements
and gestures of the traveler. “With a kind of somnolent persistence he kept turning his
gaze wherever the officer happened to be pointing, and now, as the officer was inter-
rupted by a question from the traveller, like him, he too looked at the traveller” (PC,
p. 77). On parody and mimesis as colonial strategies of resistance, see Stuart Hall, “The
Spectacle of the #Other!”, in: Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying
Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London, 1997). On a comprehensive “postcolonial” reading of
Kafka see John Zilcosky, Kafka!s Travels: Exoticism, Colonialism, and the Traffic of
Writing (New York, 2004).
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At the same time, Kafka!s In the Penal Colony impressively unfolds the com-
plex workings of representation, delegation, and speaking for others. Not only is
the officer the “sole representative [Vertreter]” of the long-established execution
procedure and “at the same time the sole representative of the oldCommandant!s
legacy” (PC, p. 86),9 for which he tries to win the traveler as an advocate and
intercessor; he also stands and speaks for an apparently both archaic and modern
version of punishment, speech, and writing that seems to anticipate not only the
technological possibilities of memory, archive, and reproduction but also the
technological machineries of the extermination camps of the 20th century. The
troubles of representation and speaking for others are also reflected in the person
of the traveler. Although “travelling simply as an observer and not with the
smallest intention of changing the legal constitution of a foreign country” (PC,
p. 86), he seemingly never speaks for himself. He acts not only as a representative
and envoy of Europe and the project of enlightenment but also – whether he likes
it or not – as a representative, delegate, and intercessor of the condemned man,
the soldier, the officer, and the commandant.
In short, the traveler embodies, as it were, the scandal of representation, of
speaking and acting for others, which is just as impossible as it is inevitable. For
him, there is no neutral position; his speaking is always already – be it in the most
banal remark: “yes, I observed the execution”, or “yes, I heard all the ex-
planations” (PC, p. 91) – a performative act of judgment. Without actually
speaking, he speaks for the condemned man; he judges and condemns (the offi-
cer) without being appointed as a judge; and yet at the same time he evades his
responsibility by finally fleeing the island.
The main focus of interest in Kafka!s story is “a remarkable apparatus” (ein
eigentümlicher Apparat).What makes this apparatus remarkable is the fact that it
does not simply kill the convict, who does not know the sentence that has been
imposed on him, but rather inscribes the sentence with fine needles upon his body
in a twelve-hour procedure until death occurs. Thus, the act of inscription is at
once the announcement and the execution of the judgment. This also means,
however, that the act of inscription is a genuine act of communication; and as in
every act of communication, “malfunctions do occur,” as the officer has to con-
cede. However, these malfunctions can – in contrast to the many pitfalls of ev-
eryday communication – be “put right straight away” (PC, p. 76). In short, what
makes the apparatus so remarkable (eigentümlich), peculiar, and worthy of being
noticed and remembered, is its ability to fabricate a script and to create amemory.
Here, it is important that we bear inmind the ambivalentmeanings of theGerman
eigentümlich.For eigentümlich (deriving fromEigentum, “property”) signifies not
only “belonging exclusively (to),” “proper (to),” “characteristic (of),” “inherent
(to),” and “specific (to)” but also “peculiar,” “singular,” “strange,” “queer,”
9 The English edition misleadingly translates the German “Vertreter” as “cham-
pion”.
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“odd,” thus comprising both what is one!s own and its apparent opposite. Ac-
cordingly, the German eigentümlich evades the opposition between the own and
the foreign, the known and the unknown, the proper and the improper. Indeed, it
seems to dwell in the very undecidability of these oppositions.
Thus, to be “in the penal colony” – either as a soldier, officer, or traveler –
means above all to be exiled from home, from that which exclusively belongs to us
and seems typical of us, from our own native language, so that, strangely enough,
the all-too-heavy uniforms in Kafka!s story come to represent that which we do
notwant to lose contact with: “#Surely these uniforms are too heavy for the tropics
[Tropen],! said the traveller, instead of enquiring after the apparatus as the officer
had expected. #Indeed,! said the officer, washing hands dirty fromoil and grease in
a waiting bucket of water, #but they mean home; we don!t want to lose contact
with our home country.!” (PC, p. 75) What becomes apparent here is not only the
alienating and proliferating power of the tropics the colonizer feels entitled to
control and dominate but also the disseminative force of rhetorical tropes. It is
certainly no coincidence that the German Tropen means both “tropes” and
“tropics.” In this sense, the penal colony is not only a tropical island but also an
“island of tropes,”10 a place where no proper, literal language seems to exist, and
where the persuasive power of rhetoric undermines any clear and distinct
meaning and usurps every act of communication.
Indeed, all terms, figures, and personae seem to be inscribed into Kafka!s text
in a twofold sense. At first sight, the officer and the traveler belong to two dif-
ferent epistemic systems and regimes, thus representing two conflicting world-
views: One is “the liberal, humanitarian outlook of the European traveler;” the
other is “the officer!s fanatical, quasi-religious dedication to the torture-ma-
chine.”11 Put differently, we are confronted with the opposition betweenOccident
andOrient, between reason andbarbarism, or, as Foucault puts it, between, on the
one hand, the “universal communication of knowledge and the infinite free ex-
change of discourses in Europe” and, on the other hand, “the monopolised and
secret knowledge of Oriental tyranny.”12
At a second glance, however, it becomes obvious that the traveler and the
officer share at least a common language. It is their discourse alone, the “ve-
hicular, urban, governmental language” of the colonizer,13 that becomes loud and
10 MarkAnderson, “TheOrnaments ofWriting:Kafka, Loos and the Jugendstil”,New
German Critique 43 (1988): 125–45, p. 138.
11 Ritchie Robertson, “Introduction and Notes”, in: The Metamorphosis and Other
Stories (Oxford, 2009), pp. xxvi–xxvii.
12 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse”, in: Untying the Text: A Post-Structur-
alist Reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston, 1981), p. 62.
13 On the distinction between a “vernacular, maternal, or territorial language, used in
rural communities” and “a vehicular, urban, governmental, even worldwide language, a
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audible; and only the two of them are able to switch between the different codes,
languages, and systems. Thus, we learn that the language in which they commu-
nicate is French, although it is probably neither the officer!s nor the traveler!s
native language. It is, rather, the dominant governmental language they mutually
come to accept as lingua franca, which in turn is understood neither by the soldier
nor by the condemned man (see PC, p. 77). Note also that their conversation
encompasses the whole range of linguistic modes of expression, from eloquent
silence to whispering to shouting, while the vernacular, territorial, regional lan-
guage of the soldier and the condemnedman remains an indeterminatemuttering
or soundless giggling, interrupted only once by the twomen!s loud laughter, which
immediately turns into a “silent laughter” (PC, p. 96). In other words, although
the soldier and the condemnedman are constantly speakingwith each other, none
of their words are audible for us or become effective. Within the hegemonic
system of representation, their words are “considered null and void,” as Foucault
puts it with regard to the division of reason andmadness, “having neither truth nor
importance, worthless as evidence in law, inadmissible in the authentification of
deeds or contracts.”14
Insurrectionary Speech Acts
Against this background, those rare moments in which the condemned man and
the soldier dare to speak out become even more important. At first, this happens
as a an absurd-comical and brutish act of resistance by the condemned man
towards his superior: “Throw your whip away, or I!ll eat you up [Wirf die Peitsche
weg, oder ich fresse dich]” (PC, p. 80); and then it happens again when the soldier,
after the acquittal of the condemned man and the self-execution of the officer,
addresses the traveler in an explanatory manner concerning the grave of the old
commandant: “Here!s the teahouse. … The Old Man is buried here” (PC, p. 98).
Without doubt, it is the “impossible” insurrectionary speech act of the con-
demned man that is of particular interest here. When the officer states the prin-
ciple of all his judicial sentences and decisions – “Guilt is always beyond doubt
[Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos]” (PC, p. 80) – he expresses the ultimately un-
realizable desire that there should never be any doubt – neither in the act of
speaking nor in language itself. Speech is presented here as a quasi-divine per-
formative act of a single voice that produces what it designates. “Other courts are
unable to follow this principle,” the officer declares, “for they are made up of
many persons” and are therefore ambivalent and “also subject to courts higher
than themselves” (PC, p. 80). However, since no worldly court and no language –
language of businesses, commercial exchange, bureaucratic transmission,” see Deleuze /
Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, p. 23.
14 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse”, p. 53.
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juridical or other – can ever fulfill this condition, speech and guilt are, from the
start, intrinsically linked to each other. In other words, we are guilty as soon as we
speak. Thus, the violation of duty of which the condemnedman is guilty is less that
he failed to do his service by falling asleep in front of the door of his superior than
that he speaks, that he uses language in a way he is neither legitimized nor au-
thorized to: “Instead of getting up and begging forgiveness, the man seized his
master round the legs, shook him, and shouted: #Throw your whip away, or I!ll eat
you up!” (PC, p. 80).
This speech act is disturbing in a twofold sense: Instead of begging for for-
giveness, which would have been the adequate and appropriate reaction, the act
encompasses a rebellious imperative (“Throw your whip away”) as well as an
impossible threat (“I!ll eat you up”). On the one hand, the speech act of the
condemned man is an act of resistance, suspending the logic and force of the
military order at least for a shortmoment; on the other hand, it can be understood
as an affirmative act of self-appropriation through which the condemned man
assumes and resignifies the doglike position that is assigned to himby his superior.
Thus, his impossible or catachrestic speech act undermines not only the relations
of authority and power but also the limits between the serious and the non-serious
as well as the human and the non-human.
What is unacceptable for the officer is not so much the disobedience of the
soldier as the ambiguity and uncontrollability of discourse, the constant sliding of
the chain of signifiers and the withdrawal of meaning in an open-ended process of
substitutions. Without doubt, the language of the penal colony is a language of
tropes, falsehood, delusion, and masquerade, but the real problem is not so much
the possibility of falsehood as its interminability: the substitution of one lie for
another, and so on indefinitely: “Only confusion would arise,” the officer justifies
his course of action, “if I had summoned the man and interrogated him first. He
would have lied, and if I had succeeded in refuting his lies, he would have replaced
them with fresh lies, and so on. But now I!ve got him, and I shan!t let him go. –
Does that explain everything?!” (PC, p. 80) Of course it does not. But this is a
rhetorical question, and the officer is not looking for an answer. For according to
his deadly logic, the aim and end of punishment, as it were, is to put an end to
language and speech itself, establishing an absolute and unconditional discourse
that does not allow for any answer, contradiction, or talking back. Such a dis-
course would no longer be speech but writing – a form of writing that directly
inscribes itself upon the body, without anymediation of the ear or the voice of the
other. Therefore, according to the officer, it would be pointless and useless if not
unlawful, to tell the condemned man his judgment, instead of hearing or reading
it, “[h]e will feel it in his own flesh” (PC, p. 79).
However, and quite surprisingly, the very script in which the sentence “Honour
thy superior!” is inscribed upon the body of the condemned man is not easy to
decipher: “#Read it,! said the officer. #I can!t,! said the traveller. #But it!s perfectly
clear,! said the officer. #It!s very elaborate,! said the traveller evasively, #but I can!t
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decipher it.! #Yes,! said the officer with a laugh, putting the case back into his
pocket, #it!s not a script for schoolchildren!s copy-books. One has to read it over a
long period. You would certainly be able to make it out for yourself in the end.!”
(PC, pp. 82 f.) The reason for the illegibility of the script is that it has been dec-
orated and embellished beyond recognition in order to prolong the execution.
While the “real,” “actual,” or “proper” script (eigentliche Schrift) would kill the
convict immediately, its excessive rhetorical embellishment makes possible a
deciphering with closed eyes: “Of course it shouldn!t be a simple script; after all,
it!s not supposed to kill immediately, but only within a space of twelve hours on
average; the turning-point has been calculated to come at the sixth hour. So the
actual script [eigentliche Schrift] has to be surrounded by many, many flourishes;
the real script [wirkliche Schrift] encircles the body only in a narrow girdle; the
rest of the body is intended for decoration.” (PC, p. 83)
In other words, because of the many rhetorical flourishes, the procedure is
prolonged to such an extent that the sentence inscribes itself not only upon the
body but also upon the mind of the condemned man, with its tropic-tropological
turning point occurring around the sixth hour.According to this paradoxical logic,
it is precisely the temporal deferral caused by the rhetoricity of the script that is
the condition of possibility for deciphering its actual, proper meaning and, thus,
for gaining knowledge and salvation without any mediation. “Indeed, nothing
further happens; theman simply begins to decipher the script; he purses his lips as
if he were listening. You have seen it is not easy to decipher the script with one!s
eyes; but ourmandeciphers themwith hiswounds.Admittedly, it is hardwork.He
needs six hours to accomplish it.” (PC, p. 84)
Thus, the ultimate promise of the remarkable apparatus is that it might be
possible to communicate directly through the materiality of the script and the
body. This bodily script would not be a derived, secondary, or perverted form
of human speech; rather, as a “sign language of the stronger,” it would be its
most fundamental form.15 Not surprisingly, Kafka!s writing apparatus recalls
Nietzsche!s cruel mnemotechnics, which is necessary to create a memory for the
human animal and to breed an animal with the right to make promises. Just as the
sentence inscribes itself upon the body of the convict, until he recognizes and
misrecognizes it as his own, “[m]an could never do without blood, torture, and
sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself.”16 But while in
Nietzsche this cruel and violent process ends with the sovereign individual, “the
manwho has his own independent protractedwill and the right tomake promises,”
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden,
2nd ed. (München et al., 1988), vol. 10, p. 298. On a more detailed account on Kafka and
Nietzsche, see Gerald Posselt, “Die Gewalt der Tropen. Sprache, Schrift und Einschrei-
bung bei Kafka und Nietzsche”, in: Leib und Sprache. Zur Reflexivität verkörperter
Ausdrucksformen, ed. Emmanuel Alloa / Miriam Fischer (Weilerswist, 2013).
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York, 1989), p. 61.
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“whose trust is a mark of distinction, who give[s] [his] word as something that can
be relied on,”17 in Kafka we are confronted with a threefold speechlessness: the
dullness of the “poor, downtrodden people” awaiting the resurrection of the old
commandant and his authoritarian regime; the submissiveness of the soldier and
the condemned man running behind the traveler “in silence, for they dared not
shout out” (PC, p. 99); and the apathy of the traveler who evades any kind of
involvement by fleeing the island.
If we now return to the distinction between reformist and revolutionary politics
as suggested by Foucault and Deleuze, the condemned man can be construed,
prima facie, as themanof action and revolution, while the soldier seems to arrange
himself mimetically with the dominant regime of representation. But neither the
soldier!s mimesis nor the condemned man!s catachresis are ultimately success-
ful.18 While the condemned remains silent despite his verdict of acquittal, the
speech of the soldier lacks force and power: he reports and describes, but he
cannot produce or transform a situation. In the end, both are left behind in silence
on the tropic-tropological island, without a language of their own. The only lan-
guage they understand is, so it seems, a violent sign language of injuries. It
therefore makes perfect sense that the traveler!s silent threat with a “heavily
knotted rope” suffices to prevent them from following him, even though they
would “still have been able to leap into the boat” (PC, p. 99). In other words, the
soldier and the condemnedman have to acknowledge not the physical superiority
of the traveler, but that they do not have a “proper” language to show the “signs of
equality.”19
This situation recalls Herodotus! tale of the Scythian slave revolt as adopted by
Jacques Ranci(re to illustrate the foundations of politics. After the Scythians fail
to crush the uprising of their former slaves by force of arms, they lay their weapons
aside and approach them equipped only with their horsewhips. Struck by this sea
change, the slaves throw their arms away and flee without fight. Thus, all that is
necessary for the Scythians to defeat their slaves is to “show the signs of their
difference in nature;” for, what the slaves “cannot do is transform equality in war
17 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, pp. 59 f.
18 On mimesis, mimicry, and catachresis as forms of resistance, see Gayatri Chakra-
vorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in:Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,
ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, 1988); Homi K. Bhabha, The Lo-
cation of Culture (London/New York, 1994); Hall, “The Spectacle of the #Other!”; Wil-
liam Schouppe, Between Mimesis and Catachresis: Deconstruction and the Politics of
Representation in Postcolonial Studies (Chapel Hill, 1996); Gerald Posselt, Katachrese.
Rhetorik des Performativen (München, 2005).
19 See Jacques Ranci(re, “Konsens, Dissens, Gewalt”, in:Gewalt. Strukturen, Formen,
Repräsentationen, ed. Mihran Dabag, Antje Kapust, and Bernhard Waldenfels (Mün-
chen, 2000), p. 99.
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into political freedom.”20 The same holds true for the soldier and the condemned
man. Of course, they speak in their vernacular, territorial, regional language, but
their words remain either unheard or without effect. Neither in the repressive
system of the penal colony nor in the liberal, humanitarian system of the Euro-
pean traveler can their interests and rights be asserted; and a new system is
currently not in sight.We could even go a step further and say that it is solidarity as
such that cannot be expressed, since there is no language inwhich it can be audibly
articulated,21 an aspect that is also reflected in the helplessness and apathy of the
traveler.
This seemingly aporetic situation also appears in the unsatisfying ending of
Kafka!s story. Or as Kafka puts it: “Two or three of the final pages are botched,
and their presence points to some deeper flaw [Mangel]; there is a worm some-
where which hollows out the story, dense as it is.”22 However, this flaw or in-
sufficiency is perhaps not somuch a flaw as an essential element of Kafka!s text in
particular and of language in general. For it can be argued that without this
insufficiency every meaning would be already fixed, every interpretation de-
termined in advance, and every act of speaking upmade impossible from the start.
Thus, as outlined above, there would be no speech at all, but only the mere
exchange of commands and injuries. In the final analysis, this means that Kafka!s
In the Penal Colony is a text not only about the impossibility and inevitability of
representation and speaking for others but also about the impossibility of an
“own,” “proper” language that could be fully controlled and mastered by us.
From Literature to Politics
One way to deal with this aporetic situation is to think of Kafka!s text as a
paradigmatic example of a “minor literature,” a concept he outlines in a diary
entry from 25December 1911, and which is idiosyncratically adopted by Deleuze
andGuattari in their studyKafka: Toward aMinor Literature (1975).23According
20 Jacques Ranci(re, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1999),
p. 13.
21 See Hito Steyerl, “Die Gegenwart der Subalternen”, in: Can the Subaltern Speak?
Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation (Wien / Berlin, 2008), p. 14.
22 Franz Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors (New York, 1977), Letter to
KurtWolff, September 4, 1917. On the “gnawing worm” of bad conscience see Nietzsche,
On the Genealogy ofMorals, p. 81, and, with particular reference to Kafka, Jeff Fort, The
Imperative to Write: Destitutions of the Sublime in Kafka, Blanchot, and Beckett (New
York, 2014), pp. 144–160.
23 Kafka!s phrase “kleine Literaturen” was translated by Marthe Robert into French
as “minor litteratures” which was subsequently adopted by Deleuze and Guattari (see
Pascale Casanova, “Literature as World”, in: New Left Review 31 (2005): 71–90, p. 84).
The English edition translates “kleine Literaturen” as “the literature of small people”
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toDeleuze andGuattari, aminor literature – or rather “minor literatures” (Kafka
deliberately uses the word in the plural, “kleine Literaturen”) – is not simply the
literature of a linguistic minority but the literature “which a minority constructs
within amajor language.”24Anexample of such aminor languagewas theGerman
spoken by the Jews of Prague in the Austrian empire, while Czech itself was a
minor language in relation to German; “and Kafka, a Czechoslovakian Jew
writing inGerman, submits German to creative treatment as a minor language.”25
This also means that the opposition between minority and majority is not just a
question of numbers,26 as well as that there is nominor language as such: Aminor
language always only exists in relation to amajor language that itself can becomea
minor language.
(Franz Kafka,TheDiaries: 1910–1923 (NewYork, 1948)). On the “distortion” of Kafka!s
concept by Deleuze and Guattari see Paul North, The Problem of Distraction (Stanford,
California, 2012), pp. 95–99, p. 203 (n. 17), and Pascale Casanova, TheWorld Republic of
Letters (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), pp. 204 f. Casanova himself favors the translation
“small literatures.” On the concept of minor literatures in postcolonial contexts see the
edited volumes Abdul R. JanMohamed / David Lloyd, eds., The Nature and Context of
Minority Discourse (Oxford, 1990), and Russell Ferguson et al. , eds., Out There: Mar-
ginalization and Contemporary Cultures (New York / Cambridge, 1991).
24 Deleuze / Guattari,Kafka: Toward aMinor Literature, p. 16; hereafter abbreviated
as K.
25 Gilles Deleuze / Fe´lix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia (Minneapolis, 1987), p. 104. This double diaspora made the writing of the Prague
Jews impossible in all respects. Kafka himself even speaks of three “linguistic im-
possibilities” that afflicted the writing of the Prague Jews: “The impossibility of not
writing, the impossibility of writing German, the impossibility of writing differently”
(Kafka,Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, Letter toMax Brod, June 1921). Or in the
words of Deleuze and Guattari: First, “the impossibility of not writing because national
consciousness … necessarily exists by means of literature;” second, “the impossibility of
writing in German,” insofar as their German was a minority language detached from its
homeland (even though it was the language of a dominant minority, “an oppressive
minority that speaks a language cut off from the masses, like a #paper language! or an
artificial language”); and finally, the impossibility of writing otherwise, “writing other
than in German,” because they felt “an irreducible distance from their primitive Czech
territoriality” (K, p. 16). In this context, Casanova underlines the significance of Kafka!s
discovery of “Yiddishkeit” at the end of 1911 through the Polish theater actor Yitzchak
Lowy (Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, pp. 269–273).
26 See Deleuze / Guattari,AThousand Plateaus, p. 105: “Majority implies a constant,
of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it. Let us
suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-
male-speaking a standard language. … It is obvious that #man! holds the majority, even if
he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals,
etc.”
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Subsequently, Deleuze andGuattari differentiate three main characteristics of
minor literatures: First, in minor literatures language is deterritorialized, which is
to say that language is detached from its supposed home country and subjected to
a series of displacements and relocations; second, “everything in them is politi-
cal,” because in minor literature “its cramped space forces each individual in-
trigue to connect immediately to politics;” and third, in minor literatures “ev-
erything takes on a collective value,” insofar as “what each author says individually
already constitutes a common action, andwhat he or she says or does is necessarily
political, even if others aren!t in agreement” (K, p. 17, my emphasis).27 Accord-
ingly, minor literatures are literatures that deterritorialize language, that connect
the individual directly to the political, and that – without assuming the self-
presence of a speaking subject – produce “collective assemblages of enunciation”
and “an active solidarity in spite of skepticism” (K, pp. 17 f.). Understood in this
way, the adjective “minor,” as Deleuze and Guattari argue, no longer qualifies
“specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within
the heart of what is called great (or established) literature” (K, p. 18). Con-
sequently, the task of writing, as understood by Kafka, is precisely the task of
“becoming-minor;” it is to “make use of the polylingualism of one!s own lan-
guage, to make a minor or intensive use of it” (K, pp. 27 f.).
This brings me back to my initial question concerning the problem of repre-
sentation and the ambivalent role of the intellectual within political struggles. For
it can be argued that the task of becoming minor applies not only to literature but
also, more generally, to the realm of the political. As we have seen, however,
Foucault and Deleuze denounce any kind of speaking for others as patronizing
and degrading. Since the people can speak perfectly well for themselves, as they
claim, it is rather amatter of creating the necessary conditions for this speaking by
fighting the “system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this dis-
course and this knowledge” (IP, p. 207).28 In the final analysis, this means, ac-
cording to Deleuze, that we have to abandon representation as such and, instead,
favor a concept of theoretical and practical action.
As has been shown, this account turns out to be highly problematic for several
reasons: First, it presupposes the existence of a popular will that can be directly
articulated; second, the people or the masses are imagined as a homogeneous,
unified entity without ruptures and faults; and third, immediacy is viewed as a
value in its own right, to the effect that what is directly articulated is considered
27 See also Kafka!s phrase that “literature is less a concern of literary history than of
the people” (Kafka, The Diaries: 1910–1923, December 25, 1911), which, of course, does
not mean that it represents the people.
28 Consequently, the “intellectual!s role is no longer to place himself #somewhat ahead
and to the side! in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to
struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in
the sphere of #knowledge,! #truth,! #consciousness,! and #discourse!” (IP, pp. 207 f.).
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legitimate per se. Such a conception comes dangerously close to current emerging
right-wing populist movements in Europe and the United States, which declare
liberal intellectuals, the political establishment, and the censorship by the liberal
regime of “political correctness” their enemies.
In contrast, I have argued that we cannot escape the process of representation.
We always already represent others – whether we like it or not. Thus, the problem
is not representation as such but rather its repression – either by rejecting the
inevitability of representation and the concomitant responsibility it imposes on us
(this is what the traveler does in Kafka!s In the Penal Colony by fleeing the island)
or by assuming a discourse or a knowledge that appears as soon as it is freed from
the oppressive power of censorship (this is whatDeleuze andFoucault suggest). If,
however, it is true that we always already speak on behalf and in the place of
others and that we do not have at our disposal a neutral, quasi-universal language
that would allow us to switch between different codes, idiolects, and languages
without patronizing or silencing others, then it becomes crucial tomake aminor or
polylingual use of our language, even if or precisely because “it is a major lan-
guage or has been.” According to Deleuze and Guattari, this means that we must
strive “to oppose theoppressed quality of this language to its oppressive quality, to
find points of nonculture or underdevelopment, linguistic Third World zones by
which a language can escape.” In other words, what is at stake is the “possibility of
making of [one!s] own language … a minor utilization” and to become “a sort of
stranger within [one!s] own language” (K, pp. 26 f.),29 while at the same time
resisting the phantasmagoric desire for reterritorialization (archaic, symbolic,
religious, etc.) – as exemplified by the messianic prophecy at the end of Kafka!s
story that promises its faithful followers the resurrection of the old commandant
and the recapture of the colony.
Toward a Becoming-Minor
Against this background it now becomes clear that the concept of becoming-
minor is not only directed against essentialist ideas of cultural identity and purity
but also provides us with a normatively significant criterion for differentiating
between emancipatory forms of speaking out andmaking oneself heard and their
reactionary and reterritorializing counterparts. Progressive, emancipatory ap-
proaches seek to extend the realm of the visible and hearable for those who are
29 Note that Benjamin – quoting Pannwitz – argues in his famous essay “The Task of
the Translator” that the “basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in
which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully
affected by the foreign tongue. …Hemust expand and deepen his language by means of
the foreign language” (Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator”, in: Selected
Writings. Volume 1: 1913–1926 (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), p. 262).
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especially vulnerable to violence and discrimination – not by simply expanding
the scope of language, but by making a minor use of language, thereby exposing a
strangeness and vulnerability inherent not only in each individual language but in
language itself. In contrast to this, right-wing populist, alt-right, and far-right
groups – despite their differences and occasional disagreements – ultimately share
the same objective: “to assume a major function in language, to offer themselves
as a sort of state language, an official language” (K, p. 27). This attempt to assume
at all costs a major function in language is nothing more than the self-destructive
desire for a language in which every meaning is unequivocal and every statement
instantaneously becomes law, without any mediation or representation – like the
judgment In the Penal Colony, which is experienced even with closed eyes, be-
cause all know: “now Justice is being done” (PC, p. 87).
The disturbing ending of Kafka!s story makes strikingly clear where such a
desire ultimately leads to – namely, to the self-destruction of the remarkable
apparatus and its “sole representative,” the officer. The well-known statement
“America First,” which undermines its claim to superiority as soon as it is asserted
(otherwise, there would be no need to state it at all), is just one prominent var-
iation of this desire. It is a desire that is usually accompanied by the aspiration to
become invulnerable, which, because it can never be realized, in turn leads to an
excessive heightening of the vulnerability of others. Bearing this in mind, we can
see that the notorious claim of right-wing populists and extremists to freedom of
speech and the “courage of the truth,”30 along with the claim that they alone are
the mouthpiece of the “real people,” is not meant to give a voice to the people, let
alone to those who are especially exposed to violence, disenfranchisement, and
discrimination, but rather to totalize speech and language itself by short-circuiting
the work of representation and translation.
Contrary to this desire for putting an end to representation as such and for
assuming a major function in language, emancipatory politics must stress the task
of becoming-minor.Here, according toDeleuze andGuattari, “becoming-minor”
does not mean that we should seek to become a minority or join an already
existing minority in a given society – for example, women, black people, Jews, etc.
What is at stake is, rather, a becoming-minor that also affects the so-called
“majority:” a becoming-woman that also affects non-women, a becoming-black
that also affects people who are not black, etc. The same applies to minor lan-
guages: they are not simply sublanguages, idiolects, or dialects but the becoming-
effective of a minor use of a major language that in turn affects the entire lan-
guage.31 In fact, to dwell in a language that is not one!s own is not just a problem of
30 See Gerald Posselt / Sergej Seitz, “Sprachen des Widerstands. Zur Normativität
politischer Artikulation bei Foucault und Ranci(re”, in: Foucault und das Politische.
Transdisziplinäre Impulse für die politische Theorie der Gegenwart, ed. OliverMarchart /
Renate Martinsen (Wiesbaden, 2018).
31 See Deleuze / Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 106, and Gilles Deleuze, “Philo-
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minorities, especially immigrants and their children, “but also a problem for all of
us: how to tear a minor literature away from its own language, allowing it to
challenge the language and making it follow a sober revolutionary path?” (K,
p. 19).
Surprisingly, however, Deleuze and Guattari locate the political potential of
such a becoming-minor not so much in insurrectionary or political speech acts as
in the literary works of authors “termed #minor,! who are in fact the greatest, the
only greats.”32 Thus, if we do not want to lose the political significance of Deleuze
andGuattari!s concept of becoming-minor,we also have to think of those forms of
speaking up and making oneself heard that explicitly take place in the domain of
the political. Possible examples of such a minor use of political language and
speech are the public intonation of the American national anthem in Spanish by
“illegal” immigrants in the United States or the use of the “human microphone”
during theOccupy protests.33 In the first case, illegal immigrants, who do not have
a politically audible voice,make aminor use of the dominant language not only by
intoning theAmerican national anthem in Spanish but also by problematizing the
“We” of the nation as a plurality that needs to be renegotiated.34 In the second
case, the task of becoming minor manifests itself in the productive performative
contradiction that the joint practice of the “human microphone” both performs
andnameswhen the “I” of the speaker is echoed and amplified by themultitude of
the crowd.35 What becomes apparent here – besides the split between the subject
sophie et minorit*”, in: Critique 369 (1978): 154–55. Consequently, according to Jan-
Mohamed and Lloyd, “#becoming minor! is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes
of minorities in dominant ideology would want us to believe), but a question of position –
a subject-position that can only be defined, in the final analysis, in #political! terms, that is,
in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disfranchisement, social ma-
nipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation ofminority subjects and
discourses” (Abdul R. JanMohamed / David Lloyd, “Introduction: Toward a Theory of
Minority Discourse”, in: Cultural Critique 6 (1987): 5–12, p. 11).
32 Deleuze / Guattari, AThousand Plateaus, p. 105.
33 Other examples are (with certain limitations) the proliferation of the hashtag
#Metoo to raise awareness of sexual assault and harassment, or, though on a different
level, Didier Eribon!s autobiographical study Returning to Reims (Cambridge, Mass.,
2013), inwhich, interweaving the subjective language of autobiographywith the objective
language of sciences, he reflects on the role of the intellectual and analyzes the fault lines
between class identities and sexual identities.
34 See Judith Butler / Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State?
Language, Politics, Belonging (Oxford, 2007); and Gerald Posselt, “Outraging Speech:
On the Politics of Performative Contradictions”, in: Subjectivation in Political Theory
and Contemporary Practices, ed. Andreas Oberprantacher and Andrei Siclodi (London,
2016).
35 See Gerald Posselt, “Representing Consensus and Dissent: On the (Anti-)-
Representational Politics of the Occupy Movement”, in: EPEKEINA. International
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of enunciation and the subject of the statement – are not only the bodily and
material conditions of speech that constitute every speech act as a bodily act but
also the fact that my speech is only my speech insofar as it is always already the
speech of everybody else. Thus, the echo of the multitude exposes, as it were, the
split of the subject. Or to put this point in Lacanian terms: “language comes from
the Other, and the idea that #I! am master of my discourse is only an illusion.”36
These examples also highlight that the task of becoming minor does not nec-
essarily entail a micro-politics that is limited to particularistic power struggles.
According toOliverMarchart, such amicro-politics would be no politics at all, for
“in order to be reasonably describable as political, a particular project has to
possess the tendency [to] becoming-major, even if it will never be able to achieve
the status of full universality … . An agent who aims for the opposite, meaning a
particularistic project of self-minorisation, and eventually of self-ghettoisation,
would effect a standstill in themovement towards universality and thereby induce
the project!s resignation from politics.”37
Even though I largely concur with this description, it is not an objection to the
task of becoming minor. In fact, I want to argue that becoming minor, far from
being a minority politics or a “particularistic project of self-minorisation,” is an
essential element of any emancipatory project of political subjectivation, coali-
tion building, and collective political agency. For it is only by making a minor use
of one!s language that a claim to universality can be articulated without patron-
izing and colonizing others. In other words, the tendency of becoming major as a
necessary moment of politics must, at the same time, be supplementd by the task
of becoming minor, and vice versa.38 This also resonates with Judith Butler!s
notion of cultural translation, as proposed in her exchange with Ernesto Laclau
and Slavoj Zˇizˇek. According to Butler, cultural translation does not mean the
transfer of a specific concept of universality between different cultures, as this
Journal of Ontology, History and Critics 7/1-2 (2016): 1–13. The human microphone is a
practice adopted by the Occupy movement after the New York City Council prohibited
the use ofmicrophones and sound systems inZuccotti Park. Each sentence of the speaker
is repeated and echoed by the whole group, while the participants of the assembly ac-
company the speech with bodily gestures to express and articulate consent, dissent, their
wish to speak, etc.
36 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London/
New York, 1996), p. 55.
37 Oliver Marchart, Thinking Antagonism: Political Ontology After Laclau (Edin-
burgh, 2018, p. 136); see also OliverMarchart,Die politischeDifferenz. ZumDenken des
Politischen bei Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Berlin, 2010), pp. 301 f.
38 In a similar vein, Zˇizˇek argues that “each particular position, in order to articulate
itself, involves the (implicit or explicit) assertion of its ownmodeof universality,”while, in
turn, universality is always already contaminated by the particular and constituted by
implicit exclusions. See Judith Butler / Ernesto Laclau / Slavoj Zˇizˇek, Contingency, He-
gemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London, 2000), p. 315.
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would amount to the “use of the doctrine of universality in the service of colo-
nialism and imperialism.”39Rather, cultural translation ought to be understood as
the continuous “labour of transaction and translation which belongs to no single
site, but is the movement between languages, and has its final destination in this
movement itself.”40
However, and in addition to, Butler!s account of cultural translation, the task of
becoming minor, as proposed here, is not simply a movement between languages
that has its final end in themovement itself. Rather, it is a movement or becoming
that affects all languages involved. Furthermore, it is important to understand that
no language, however minor, is immune to the tendency to become major, which,
of course, does not relieve us from the necessity to counter this tendency.41Various
kinds of deterritorializations, as we experience them in the current era of glob-
alization, tend to engender new forms of ethnic, religious, nationalist, or cultural
reterritorializations. This is apparent in the sweeping electoral success of populist
movements in Europe and the United States, the Brexit vote in the United
Kingdom, or the re-emergence of nationalism and independence efforts within
the European Union. Consequently, the task of becoming minor, of making a
minor use of language, is neither an achievable goal nor an end in itself, but rather
a continuous reworking of language such that solidarity can be articulated.
As a result, we have to differentiate between, first, particularistic projects of
self-minorization that cannot reasonably be called “political”; second, the ten-
dency of becoming major by putting an end to language and speech – and, thus, to
politics – itself; and, third, the task of becoming minor by making a minor use of
language, even if – or precisely because – it is a major language or has been. This
distinction is important. For if the only condition of politics were the tendency of
becoming major, then there would be no way to differentiate between, on the one
hand, progressive, emancipatory political projects and, on the other hand, na-
tionalistic, racist, and xenophobic ambitions. If, however, we accept the propo-
sition that becoming minor is a necessary prerequisite for any emancipatory po-
litical project, wemight gain a criterion for evaluating different forms of speaking
up andmaking oneself heard – even though the task of becomingminor cannot, by
39 Butler / Laclau / Zˇizˇek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 15.
40 Butler / Laclau / Zˇizˇek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 179.
41 Right-wing groups, presenting themselves as the sole advocates of free speech,
usually reject, inter alia, guidelines for a gender-neutral language with the argument that
such guidelines would impose a liberal regime of “political correctness.” This argument
deliberately ignores that the spoken dominant or “official” language systematically si-
lences large parts of the population; think, for example, of the use of the generic mas-
culinum in German or the term “man” in English, which signifies both the species in
general and amale person. In this sense, guidelines for a gender-neutral language are, to a
certain extent, an attempt to “institutionalize” a becoming-minor that, at the same time,
must resist the tendency to becomemajor by permanently reflecting on its own workings.
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definition, assume the formof a political programor agenda. Thus, what is needed
for a renewed political Left are not only new political alliances, strategies, and
agendas – though they are, of course, essential to any reasonable political project –
but also a political language – of both political theory and political action – that
makes a minor use of itself.42
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